1. Introduction
A persistent assumption in both philosophy and cognitive science is that genuine biological agency requires intentional states — beliefs, desires, goals. The APS framework challenges this assumption by grounding biological agency in organisational properties of living systems rather than in cognitive capacities.
2. Minimal Agency
Following Barandiaran et al. (2009), the APS framework identifies three necessary conditions for minimal biological agency: individuality, asymmetric interaction with the environment, and normativity. Crucially, none of these conditions require intentional states.
A bacterium navigating a chemical gradient satisfies all three conditions. It is an individual system, it interacts asymmetrically with its environment (moving towards nutrients, away from toxins), and its behaviour is normative — some outcomes are better for the system’s continued existence than others.
3. The Intentionality Gradient
Rather than drawing a sharp line between “genuine” agents (those with intentions) and mere mechanisms, APS proposes a gradient. Biological agency at its most minimal involves self-maintenance without representation. More complex forms of biological agency involve increasingly sophisticated forms of environmental coupling, anticipation, and eventually, intentional states.