Naturalisation can clarify how a difficult biological concept might be formulated in scientifically tractable terms. It does not by itself demonstrate that the resulting formulation is correct, biologically necessary, empirically validated, or explanatorily superior to alternatives.
Within APS, conceptual closure concerns whether the relevant terms, relations, boundaries, and explanatory target have been specified clearly enough for a claim to become assessable. It should not be confused with evidential closure, theoretical consensus, or proof that competing formulations are inadequate.
Naturalisation and conceptual closure can therefore help move inquiry from conceptual ambiguity toward explicit, scientifically assessable claims. What follows from those claims remains a separate question.
Where a naturalised formulation makes substantive biological or explanatory claims, those claims retain their own evidential burdens. They must be assessed against relevant evidence and, where comparative explanatory gain is claimed, against the strongest target-matched comparator.
Key Point: Naturalisation can contribute to scientific assessability. It does not convert conceptual coherence into biological truth or explanatory superiority.